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The Burger Court, The Commerce Clause, and
The Problem of Differential Treatment
EARL M. MALTZ*
The question of the extent to which the commerce clause by its own
force acts as a check on state power has been a prolific source of litigation
since well before the Civil War.' At a minimum, states have generally
been required to treat commerce from out-of-state in the same manner as
that originating in-state. This article will examine the Burger Court's
treatment of state laws which have differential impacts on in-state and
out-of-state commercial interests.
FACIAL DISCRIMINATIONS
Both facial and intentional discriminations have, with few exceptions,
2
historically been constitutionally suspect.' Boston Stock Exchange v.
State Tax Commission4 is a classic case of the type of discrimination
which the commerce clause prohibits. The case dealt with a New York tax
on securities transactions. The tax was applicable to a transfer of
securities if any one or more of five taxable events took place within the
state; for transactions involving sales, the rate of tax was determined by
the selling price per share.5 Prior to 1968, a transaction involving a sale
and transfer of stock in New York was treated the same as an in-state
transfer arising from an out-of-state sale; however, in that year the tax
was amended so that nonresidents of New York were afforded a 50%
reduction in the rate of tax for transactions involving in-state sales and
*B.A. 1972 Northwestern; J.D. 1975, Harvard. Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Arkansas (Little Rock).
'See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851); Wilson v. Black-Bird
Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (examples of early Commerce Clause
litigation).
2See text at notes 75-116, infra.
'See, e.g., Polar Ice Cream and Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
'429 U.S. 318 (1977).
'See id at 321-22, citing New York Tax Law §270.1 (McKinney 1966).
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limiting the total tax liability for any taxpayer on a New York sale to
$350.6 Obviously, where the transfer of stock was to take place, the
amendment made it more advantageous to have the sale of stock made on
the New York Stock Exchange than on, for example, the Boston Stock
Exchange. One of the avowed purposes of the amendment was "to en-
courage the effecting by nonresidents of the state of New York of their
sales within the state of New York and the retention within the state of
New York of sales involving large blocks of stock. ' 7
Applying the fundamental principle that "[n]o State may, consistent
with the commerce clause, 'impose a tax which discriminates against in-
terstate commerce ... by providing a direct commercial advantage to
local business,"' 8 the Court struck the amendment down as unconstitu-
tional. It rejected the argument that the amendment should be validated
because it was enacted merely to "neutralize" the competitive advantage
that the existence of the New York transfer tax gave to other states
which had no such tax. This argument was based on the cases which have
upheld imposition of compensating use taxes for goods bought out-of-
state where the same good would be subject to a sales tax if bought in-
state.9 The Court reasoned that in the use tax cases, an individual faced
with the choice of an in-state or out-of-state purchase would make the
choice without regard to the tax consequences, since he would have to
pay the same amount of tax no matter where he bought the goods. In
Boston Stock Exchange, on the other hand, the intention and almost cer-
tain effect of the 1968 amendments was to influence the seller of stock to
consummate his transaction within New York.
The Burger Court dealt with the problem of facial discrimination in a
different context in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell.'0 There,
Mississippi had a regulation which prohibited the sale of milk processed
out-of-state unless the state of origin accepted milk processed in
Mississippi on a reciprocal basis." The plaintiff maintained a milk pro-
cessing plant in Louisiana and wished to sell milk processed there in
Mississippi. Although the processing plant met sanitation requirements
which were substantially equivalent to those imposed by the state of
Mississippi on its own producers, 2 the milk was barred from Mississippi
markets because Louisiana had no reciprocity agreement with
Mississippi.
On its face, the Mississippi regulations discriminated against out-of-
state milk processors; out-of-state milk which met the standards required
'See 429 U.S. at 321-25, citing New York Tax Law §270-a (McKinney Supp. 1976).
'See 429 U.S. at 326-27, quoting 1968 N.Y. Laws, c. 827 §1.
'429 U.S. at 329, quoting Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358
U.S. 450, 457 (1959).
1429 U.S. at 329-330. See, e.g., General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U.S.
335 (1944); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
10424 U.S. 366 (1976).
"Id at 367.
2Id. at 369-70.
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of that processed in-state was barred from the market unless an addi-
tional condition was met. Indeed, as the Court noted, the regulations had
the practical effect of excluding all Louisiana-processed milk from the
Mississippi markets.1 3 Thus, following earlier cases which dealt with
other discriminatory regulations of the sale of milk, 14 the Court had little
trouble striking down the statute under the commerce clause. In doing
so, it rejected a number of arguments put forth by the state to justify its
reciprocity requirement. First, Mississippi asserted that the requirement
promoted the state interest in maintaining its health standards. The
Court dismissed this argument as "border[ing] on the frivolous," noting
that if there were a reciprocity agreement, milk processed in Louisiana
could be sold in Mississippi even if it did not meet the Mississippi stan-
dards.'5 Next, the state suggested that the reciprocity requirement
enabled it to assure itself that the reciprocating states' standards are the
"substantial equivalent" of those of Mississippi. Apparently, this posi-
tion was based on the theory that Mississippi would simply refuse to sign
a reciprocity agreement if the reciprocating state's standards were insuf-
ficiently high. The Court rejected this rationale on the ground that
Mississippi had available a less discriminatory alternative; it could sim-
ply apply its own standards of inspection to milk from nonreciprocating
states.1
6
In addition to the rather standard health arguments, Mississippi also
relied on the novel contention that its regulation, far from being pro-
hibited by the commerce clause, actually advanced the free-trade policy
inherent in the Constitution. 17 This argument was two-fold. First,
Mississippi contended that the reciprocity requirements helped to
eliminate "hypertechnical" differences in inspection requirements
between states which burden commerce by requiring costly duplicative
or out-of-state inspections where for health purposes the standards were
"substantially equivalent." While recognizing that "mutually beneficial
objectives may be promoted by voluntary reciprocity agreements," the
Court rejected this justification for the challenged regulation, holding
that "Mississippi may not use the threat of economic isolation as a
weapon to force sister states to enter into even a desirable reciprocity
agreement." 8
Finally, Mississippi asserted that the reciprocity requirement was
justified as a means of demolishing the economic barriers which
Louisiana had erected to prevent the sale of Mississippi milk in
Louisiana-barriers which allegedly themselves violated the commerce
"Id- at 375.
"See, e.g., Polar Ice Cream and Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964); Dean Milk
Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
1424 U.S. at 375-76.
16Id- at 375-77. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
1I& at 378-79.
Igld- at 379.
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clause.19 Here the Court considered two cases. First, if Louisiana in fact
unconstitutionally burdened the interstate flow of milk then the
reciprocity requirement was unnecessary; Mississippi milk producers
could directly vindicate their constitutional rights in court.20 And if, on
the other hand, Louisiana was legitimately exercising its police powers to
protect the health of its citizens, "Mississippi is not privileged under the
commerce clause to force its own judgments as to an adequate level of
milk sanitation on Louisiana at the pain of an absolute ban on the in-
terstate flow of commerce in milk. 21
FACIALLY NEUTRAL STATUTES WITH DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT
Boston Stock Exchange and Cottrell both were basically straightfor-
ward applications of well-established principles of commerce clause
analysis.2 2 But determining whether other laws should be placed in the
"discriminatory" category for purposes of commerce clause analysis is
often not quite so simple, and may often be critical in deciding whether
the law survives a constitutional challenge. Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Commission 3 provides an interesting case in point. Hunt involved
a North Carolina statute which required that all closed containers of
apples sold, offered for sale or shipped into the state display the ap-
plicable U.S.D.A. grade or none at all.24 The state of Washington, the na-
tion's largest producer of apples, had developed its own inspection pro-
gram, and required all apples shipped from the state to be tested and
graded according to the state standards; the Washington state grades
were widely accepted in the trade and each such grade was the equivalent
of, or superior to, the comparable U.S.D.A. grade.2 5 A substantial portion
of the Washington apples were packed in boxes preprinted with the ap-
plicable state grades and stored in refrigerated warehouses well before
shipment. At the time of storage there was no way of determining which
apples were to be shipped to North Carolina-the only state in the
country to forbid the use of the Washington grades.2 6 Thus, if they were
to ship apples to North Carolina at all, the Washington growers were
faced with four rather unappetizing alternatives; they could either
discontinue the use of preprinted boxes altogether, repack the apples
bound for North Carolina in new boxes when the final destination was
known, prepack the estimated number of apples to be sold to North
Carolina sources in special boxes without the Washington grades, or
9Id2
Of1& at 379-80.
21d- at 380.
22See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (regulation of milk supply);
Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S 375 (1939) (taxation).
23432 U.S. 333 (1977).24See id at 399, quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §106-189.1 (1973).
21I& at 336.
26Id at 338.
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obliterate the state grades on boxes bound for North Carolina, leaving
the product with a damaged appearance. 27 Because of understandable
reluctance of the apple growers to pursue any of these courses of action,
the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission 28 challenged the
North Carolina statute as violative of the commerce clause.
Affirming a district court decision striking down the North Carolina
law, 29 Chief Justice Burger's opinion for a unanimous court 30 conceded
that the multiplicity of inconsistent state grades under similar descrip-
tive labels posed dangers of deception and confusion in the North
Carolina market;3 further, the Court also recognized that the commerce
clause left a "residuum" of power in the states to deal with problems of
local concern 32 and that this residuum was particularly strong when the
state acts to protect its citizenry in matters pertaining to the sale of
foodstuffs.2 3
However, the Hunt court found that the challenged statute
discriminated against Washington producers by raising their cost of
doing business in North Carolina, due to the necessity of adopting a new
marketing system for that state, while North Carolina growers, who had
no independent grading system, were free to continue as before in the
state; by stripping the Washington growers of the competitive advan-
tage which they had earned through the use of their inspection and
grading system; and finally by producing a leveling effect which "in-
sidiously" operated to the advantage of North Carolina producers, since
in essence each Washington State grade signified an apple that was equal
or superior to an apple with the comparable U.S.D.A. grade.34 Since
discrimination was present, the Court stated that the state had the
burden of not only showing that the adverse effect on commerce was
outweighed by the state interest in the regulation, but also that no less
discriminatory alternative exists which was adequate to preserve the
local interest.2 5
The Court found that the challenged statute failed both tests. For a
number of reasons, the North Carolina scheme was found to do
"remarkably little" to prevent confusion and deception in the marketing
27Id.
28The Washington State Apple Advertising Commission is a Washington state agency
charged with the statutory duty of promoting and protecting the state's apple industry.
The Commission is composed of 13 Washington apple growers and dealers, nominated and
elected by their fellow growers and dealers. Its activities include the promotion of
Washington apples in both domestic and foreign markets and scientific research into the
uses, development and improvement of apples. See 432 U.S. at 337.
2 9Washington State Apple Advertising Commission v. Holshouser, 408 F. Supp. 857
(E.D.N.C. 1976) (three-judge court).
"Mr. Justice Rehnqlist did not participate. See 432 U.S. at 354.
31432 U.S. at 349.
"Id at 350, citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, at 767 (1945).
"3432 U.S. at 350, citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
146 (1963).
"'432 U.S. at 350-52.
31Id at 353, citing Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
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of foodstuffs. First, Chief Justice Burger noted that the statute allowed
the marketing of closed containers with no grades at all, a practice which,
he asserted, magnified the problems of deception and confusion by
depriving the purchasers of such apples of all quality information what-
soever. Second, he noted that the statute's primary efforts were not
aimed at consumers at large, but rather at apple wholesalers and
brokers-the group which, presumably being the most knowledgeable in
the area,was the least in need of protection. The Court also asserted that
because Washington grades in all cases are equal or superior to their
U.S.D.A. counterparts, a purchaser of apples marked with such grades
could only be misled to his benefit. Thus the Court appeared to dismiss
the means by which the state attempted to acheive a legitimate purpose
as not serving to further that purpose.3 6
Moreover, the opinion went on to suggest two less discriminatory alter-
natives. The state could either require the U.S.D.A. grade in addition to
any other state grades or alternatively, ban the use of any state grade
which, unlike Washington's, could not be demonstrated to be equal or
superior to corresponding U.S.D.A. grades. While the Court conceded
that some possibility of confusion would remain, Chief Justice Burger
concluded that "it is the type of 'confusion' that the national interest in
the free flow of goods between states demands be tolerated. ' 37
As with many cases, one can challenge the weight which the Court ac-
corded various state interests in the balancing process in Hunt. Chief
Justice Burger appears to have undervalued the state interest in its
statute. His reliance on the fact that North Carolina allows apples to be
sold in ungraded cartons was misplaced. The North Carolina statute was
aimed not at the situation in which the buyer has no information, but
rather at the danger that the buyer will be misled by the information
which he does receive. If a box of apples is ungraded, the buyer will pay a
fair price based on the probable random distribution of apples; in effect,
he is gambling on the possibility that the apples will be better than the
normal random group, but he knows that he is gambling because of the
lack of information. The North Carolina statute, on the other hand, was
concerned with the potential confusion of a buyer confusing apples
marked "U.S.D.A. X' with those graded "Washington X." Assuming
the latter denotes superior apples, North Carolina was trying to prevent
the buyer from paying an unfairly high price for U.S.D.A. X apples
because he assumes that they are the same quality as those graded
Washington X.
The Hunt Court also overemphasizes the fact that Washington grades
are all "equal or superior"; thus, the opinion argues that buyers of
Washington apples can only be deceived to their benefit by any confusion
with apples bearing only the U.S.D.A. grade. However, Chief Justice
Burger overlooked the possibility that because of the presence of the
3432 U.S. at 353-354.
"Idi at 354.
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Washington grades in the marketplace, buyers of other apples bearing
only the U.S.D.A. grades may pay an unfairly high price on the assump-
tion that they are receiving apples equal in quality to those bearing
Washington grades. Moreover, if there were a third grading system-
hypothetically, that of Wisconsin-which used grades similar in form but
each denoting apples superior to both the U.S.D.A. and the Washington
system, then buyers might also overpay for Washington apples on the
belief that they are receiving apples equal in quality to those bearing the
equivalent Wisconsin grade. The only method by which these
possibilities of confusion can be eliminated is by a requirement like that
of North Carolina-that all apples bear a grade applied by a single,
uniform system or bear no grade at all.
Even if one accepts Chief Justice Burger's view of the factual situation,
the Court's assertion that the North Carolina law was discriminatory is
crucial to its analysis, given the recognition of the state's generally broad
powers to control the conditions of sale of foodstuffs. The Chief Justice
cites five cases in support of his contention that "[w]hen discrimination
of the type we have found [in Hunt] is demonstrated," the stringent stan-
dard of review he invoked in that case is appropriate.
31
Two of those-Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews 39 and
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.-40-can be quickly dismissed as situations
in which bad motive was the deciding factor; both involved state statutes
which were overtly intended to protect in-state producers from competi-
tion from out-of-state. 41 While the Court in Hunt suggested that such a
motive might have underlay the North Carolina apple regulations, the
opinion explicitly disclaimed any reliance, on the existence of such im-
proper purpose.4 2 Each of the other three cited cases-Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. CottrelJ 43 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.44 and Dean Milk
Co. v. Madison45-did involve regulations which allegedly had
permissible purposes. In Cottrell, as already noted, Mississippi denied
Louisiana milk producers the rights to sell milk in Mississippi unless
Louisiana signed a reciprocity agreement allowing Grade A milk pro-
ducts from Mississippi to be sold in Louisiana; the only legitimate
"432 U.S. at 353.
"375 U.S. 361 (1964).
10294 U.S. 511 (1935).
"In Polar Ice Cream the Court struck down a complicated Florida regulatory scheme
which required in-state processors and distributors of milk to accept its total supply of so-
called "Class I" milk from local producers thereby excluding out-of-state milk producers
from this market. In Baldwi, New York banned the sale of any milk bought outside the
state unless the price paid to the producer was at or above the minimum which could
legally be paid to in-state producers. The Court struck this scheme down, noting that "the
avowed purpose of the [statute] is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition
between the states." 294 U.S. at 522.
"432 U.S. at 352-53.
"424 U.S. 366 (1976).
"397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
45340 U.S. 349 (1954).
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justification advanced was that the regulation was designed to assure the
distribution of healthful milk products to the people of Mississippi either
directly, or indirectly by guaranteeing that Louisiana maintained proper
inspection standards.46 In Bruce Church, at issue was an Arizona regula-
tion requiring that cantaloupes be packed in "closed standard
containers" within the state before being offered for sale; the state pur-
portedly feared that some growers were shipping inferior or deceptively
packaged produce, thus hurting the reputation of Arizona growers
generally, or, alternatively that superior Arizona cantaloupes were not
labeled as such.47 Finally, in Dean Milk-the seminal case in this
line-the city of Madison, Wisconsin forbade the sale of milk as
pasteurized unless processed and bottled at an approved pasteurization
plant within five miles of the city and also, in effect forbade the sale of
any milk in Madison unless the source of supply was within twenty-five
miles of the city; as in Cottrell, the asserted purpose was to ensure that
sanitary milk was being sold in the city.4 8
However, in each of these cases, out-of-state actors were disadvantaged
even if they met the relevant standards set by the jurisdiction. Thus, in
Cottrell and Dean Milk, out-of-state producers which processed milk in
the same manner which would allow producers in Mississippi and Mad-
dison to sell milk in their respective jurisdiction would nonetheless be for-
bidden to sell their milk solely because the location of their processing
plants. Similarly, a California packaging plant which used the same
packaging methods which would be approved if used by an Arizona plant
in Bruce Church would nonetheless not be an acceptable packager for
Arizona cantaloupes-again solely because the plant was out-of-state. 9
The situation in Hunt was quite different; any Washington apple pro-
ducer which met the same packaging standards which would be
acceptable for a North Carolina producer could sell Washington apples in
North Carolina. The out-of-state producers were thus not arguing that
they were being discriminated against because of their location, but
rather that they were "discriminated" against because it was uninten-
tionally more inconvenient (or disadvantageous) for them than for in-
state producers to meet the uniform standards imposed. 0
:'See 424 U.S. at 370-378.
47See 397 U.S. at 142-143.
:'See 340 U.S. at 353-354.
49The district court also relied on Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1941) and Min-
nesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890). See Washington State Apple Advertising Comm. v.
Holshouser, 408 F.Supp. 857, 860 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (three-judge court). In Bes4 the court
struck down as discriminatory a tax of $250 "on every person or corporation, not a regular
retail merchant in [this] state, who displays samples in any hotel room rented or occupied
temporarily for the purpose of securing retail orders." See 311 U.S. at 455. In Barber, a
statute requiring all animals must be inspected in Minnesota if fresh meat were to be sold
in the state was invalidated under the Commerce Clause. In both cases, as in Dean Milk,
the statutes on their faces discriminated on the basis of location.
SCompare Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 at 246 (1976) (in absence of discriminatory
motive, disparate racial impact insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny under equal protec-
tion clause).
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Although not cited by the Court, the prior case which most closely ap-
proximated Hunt is Breard v. City of Alexandri. 5 Breard dealt with a
city ordinance which prohibited door-to-door solicitation by vendors
unless the occupant being solicited had previously invited the vendor to
his home. The Court seemed to acknowledge that the ordinance had its
primary effect on nonlocal merchants, noting that the local retail com-
petitors generally operated from stores.52 Nonetheless, the Court upheld
the ordinance against a commerce clause challenge, holding that the or-
dinance was a valid exercise of the police power 53 and that there was no
cognizable discrimination against interstate commerce. 5
4
The parallels between Breard and Hunt are striking. Both cases in-
volved statutes, neutral on their face which prohibited certain marketing
techniques. Further, in both cases, the prohibitions tended to favor local
interests because they had not adopted the prohibited practices while
these practices were an integral part of the techniques employed by out-
of-state competitors. 5 Nonetheless, the cases reach opposite conclusions
on the question of whether the situations involve discrimination for pur-
poses of commerce clause analysis.5 6
Subsequent to Hun4 the picture was further clouded by the Court's
decision in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Marylan& 5 7 That case involved a
Maryland statute which was enacted after the oil crisis of 1973. A state
government-conducted survey indicated that during the gasoline shor-
tage, oil producers and refiners had given preference to stations which
they themselves owned over dealer-owned service stations." In response
to these findings, the state legislature passed a statute forbidding any
producer or refiner of petroleum products from operating any retail ser-
vice station within Maryland and requiring each such refiner and pro-
ducer to extend all "voluntary allowances" uniformly to all service sta-
tions which it supplied.5 9 This law was challenged as, among other things,
being an unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce.6 0
5'341 U.S. 622 (1951).
2Id. at 639. See also id. at 647-48 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
"I& at 641.
"Id, at 636-38 (by implication).
5 The fact that the Breard ordinance may have discriminated against nonlocal in-state as
well as out-of-state competitors is irrelevant. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
249, 354 n.4 (1951). Cf Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974)
(right to travel).
"Some commentators have suggested that the differing results in Dean Milk and Breard
are based in the Court's perception that the state interests in the latter were more weightly
than in the former. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 260
(1978). However, this theory simply ignores the Court's apparent conclusion that a less
stringent standard of review was appropriate in Breard because, unlike Dean Milk, the
challenged regulation was neutral on its face. See 341 U.S. at 637 (by implication).
57437 U.S. 117 (1978).
"See id. at 2211.
"Md. Ann. Code art. 56 §157E(d) (1972 Repl. Vol., 1977 Cum. Supp.).
"Those challenging the statute also argued unsuccessfully that even if non-
discriminatory the statute was an unconstitutional burden on commerce; that the statute
1979]
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Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court made short work of this conten-
tion,61 notwithstanding that almost all of the excluded dealers were out-
of-state companies.6 2 He argued that the Maryland law was not
discriminatory because it neither created a barrier to the flow of in-
terstate goods, prohibited such a flow, placed any added costs on such
goods, nor distinguished between in-state and out-of-state companies in
the retail market.13 Noting that independent dealers were not given any
advantage over similarly situated out-of-state dealers, the Court
distinguished Hunt on the ground that in the latter case "the challenged
state statute raised the cost of doing business for out-of-state dealers,
and in various other ways, favored the in-state dealer in the local
mharket." 64
As Justice Blackmun noted in dissent, the fact that some out-of-state
dealers-those who did not operate oil refining or producing facilities
-could still operate in Maryland does not adequately distinguish Exxon
from Hunt.65 All out-of-state producers were not disadvantaged in the lat-
ter; only those which used distributors located in states which had
grading systems different from that of the U.S.D.A. suffered at all from
the North Carolina statute.6 6 Similarly, Justice Stevens's argument that
Hunt was inapplicable because there was no showing of increased cost to
out-of-state producers in Exxon is also unconvincing;, the effect upon the
merchants excluded in the latter-total exclusion from the affected
market-is far more serious than a mere increase in the cost of doing
business.
Thus, if Hunt and Exxon are to be satisfactorily reconciled it must be
on the basis of a footnote in the latter in which Justice Stevens suggested
that there was no discrimination in Exxon because, unlike Hunt, there
would be no diminution of the share of the Maryland market possesed by
goods from out-of-state.67 But this distinction makes little sense in terms
of the policies underlying the commerce clause. One purpose of this
clause was to prevent states from protecting their local commercial in-
terests from competition from out-of-state interests; such protection can
be accomplished by excluding out-of-state competitors themselves as
well as by erecting barriers to the importation of goods.6 8 Thus, this
distinction also seems insubstantial.
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and that the state law was
invalid because it conflicted with federal antitrust laws.
"See 437 U.S. at 125-29.
:2See 437 U.S. at 137-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6437 U.S. at 126.
64 I&
65See 437 U.S. at 147 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
16In Hunt, although growers from thirteen states marketed apples in North Carolina,
only seven employed grading systems different from that established by the U.S.D.A. See
432 U.S. at 349.
'
7See 437 U.S. at 126-27 n.16.
Cf e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, - U.S. - (1978) (Privileges and Immunities Clause violated
by requirement that all Alaskan oil and gas leases, easements or right-of-way permits for
[Vol. 54:165
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Given the apparent inconsistency between Hunt on the one hand and
Breard and Exxon69 on the other, the question becomes which approach is
more appropriate in commerce clause analysis. The strongest argument
for the intrusive standard of review employed in Hunt is based on the
realities of the political process. One of the justifications for deference to
state legislature in such situations is that the in-state producers or
marketers will act as a political check, preventing the legislature from un-
duly burdening commerce.7 0 Thus, for example, in South Carolina
Highway Dept v. Barnwell Bros. 71 the Court applied a very lenient stan-
dard of review in upholding South Carolina's width and weight restric-
tions on trucks, notwithstanding that these restrictions excluded 85 to
95 percent of the trucks in interstate commerce. The Court relied in part
on the idea that in-state trucking interests would act as a brake on the
state legislature, insuring that unreasonable restrictions were not im-
posed.72
Implicitly, Breard also placed some reliance on the concept of the
political check. 73 Unlike the situations such as Dean Milk, where the
challenged ordinance by its terms only affected non-local producers, the
potentiality for such a check does exist whenever, as in Breard and Hunt,
a regulation limits the activity of local business people as well as out-
siders. But where a regulation, while neutral on its face, prohibits prac-
tices in which only nonlocal commercial interests are engaged, the
political pressures from local interests are likely to be in favor of the
restriction-especially where, as in Hunt the prohibited practices tended
to give the out-of-state interests a competitive advantage. Thus, the
political "check" is reversed; rather than working toward free trade, it
will tend toward the creation of commercial restrictions.
On the other hand, the deference shown in Breard and Exxon finds its
greatest support in the concept of state sovereignty. The basic theory
underlying American constitutional federalism is that the states bear the
general responsibility for protecting the general welfare of their citizenry.
In order to fulfill this mandate, the states have traditionally had broad
discretion to regulate the conditions of commerical activity with their
boundaries, as even the Hunt Court recognized. 74
oil and gas pipelines, and unitization agreements contain preference for living Alaska
residents over nonresidents); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (state may not charge
higher fees to out-of-state fisherman for privilege of shrimping commercially).
"See also Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (whether state tax
discriminates against interstate commerce to be determined without reference to other
states' systems of taxation).
70See Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18 (1978); South
Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938); Note, State En-
vironmental Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1762, 1775 & n. 74
(1974).
71303 U.S. 177 (1938).
72Id. at 187.
73341 U.S. 622 (1951).
"See 432 U.S. at 349, citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132
(1963); Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935); Corn Products
Refinery Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919).
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Of course, this authority must yield where its exercise conflicts with
some legitimate Congressional action. But Hunt did not involve a con-
flict between the state and federal governments on a question of public
policy; rather, basically the case was a dispute between the government
of North Carolina and a Washington state agency over the most effective
means of conveying to the buyer informa-ion on apples sold in North
Carolina. Given that Washington has no general constitutional power or
authority to prescribe conditions of sale in North Carolina, to hold as the
Hunt Court that North Carolina must meet a heavy burden of justifica-
tion simply because the hardships caused by its regulation fall uninten-
tionally more heavily on out-of-state interests constitutes a significant
intrusion on the concept of state sovereignty. It is at best questionable
whether the general free-trade bias inherent in the commerce clause is
sufficiently strong to support such an intrusion.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
Despite the general rule against discrimination against non-domestic
business, in some cases special limitations on out-of-state producers have
been allowed. The classic cases involve limitations on the importation of
diseased livestock. In Mintz v. Baldwin, 75 for example, the Court upheld a
New York regulation which prohibited the importation of cattle for dairy
or breeding purposes unless the herd from which they had come was cer-
tified to be free from Bang's disease by the chief sanitary official of the
state of origin of the cattle. Similarily, in Asbell v. Kansas, 76 the Court re-
jected a constitutional challenge to a Kansas law which prohibited the
importation of cattle into the state except for immediate slaughter unless
a state official had certified them as healthy. In both cases the commerce
clause attack was rejected notwithstanding that the challenged enact-
ment effectively restricted the flow of cattle into a state from outside
while leaving domestic producers unaffected.
The Burger Court had occasion to consider the scope of the exception
to the prohibition against disparate treatment created by these so-called
"inspection" or "quarantine" laws in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey.77 New Jersey law prohibited, with certain limited exceptions, the
importation from out-of-state of any solid or liquid waste.78 Brushing
aside claims that waste materials did not constitute commerce at all,7
Justice Stewart's majority opinion saw the issue as whether the prohibi-
tion "is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be
viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon in-
7289 U.S. 346 (1933).
76209 U.S. 251 (1908).
"_ U.S. _, 98 S. Ct. 2531 (1978).
"See id at 2533 quoting N.J. REV. STAT. §13:11-10.
1198 S. Ct. at 2534-35.
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terstate commerce that are only incidental."80 Since the expressed
legislative purpose underlying the prohibition was the conservation of
scarce landfill sites, the Court found the question of whether the basic
motivation was economic or environmental to be irrelevant; rather it con-
cluded that the New Jersey law violated the principle of nondiscrimina-
tion "[bloth its face and in its plain effect."'" The quarantine cases were
distinguished as situations in which the very movement of the banned
goods raised the risk of contagion; by contrast, City of Philadelphia was
viewed as a case where the harm caused by the ,waste took place only
after its disposal, and that at that point, there was no distinction between
domestic waste and that generated out-of-state.2
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented. 3 He
noted that even if disposed of in landfills, solid waste still posed signifi-
cant health hazards.8 4 Further, he argued that solid waste was as much a
hazard in transit as at the disposal site.85 Finally, even accepting the
possibility that solid waste could be transported safely, he saw as
"spointless" any distinction between those goods whose very transport
creates hazards and those which would be transported safely but whose
disposal caused problems.8 6 Thus Justice Rehnquist found City of
Philadelphia indistinguishable from the quarantine cases.
The majority and dissent differed sharply in their perception of the
proper focus for the analysis of the iommerce clause issue. Justice Rehn-
quist saw the importation of the waste itself as the overriding concern. If
one accepts this position, then his conclusion seems inescapable. Like the
diseased cattle in the quarantine cases, solid waste is an unwanted health
risk. Moreover, in terms of the dangers against which the commerce
clause was designed to protect, if only the waste itself is considered the
New Jersey law posed less of a threat than the laws upheld in the quaran-
tine cases. While one could picture an inspection law designed to protect
a state's domestic cattle industry from out-of-state economic interests, it
is hard to concieve of a state attempting to encourage domestic garbage
production by banning outside competition.
But the majority did not see the main problem as the New Jersey
statute's effect on the importation of waste; rather, Justice Stewart
focused on the idea of the statute's acting as a restriction on out-of-state
access to a New Jersey resource: sanitary landfills. 7 Thus the New
Jersey statute could not withstand commerce clause scrutiny for the
same reason.q that, for example, a state may not prohibit the export of
8"I at 2536.
"Id. at 2537.
"kId at 2538.
"Id. at 2538-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1I& at 2539 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 2540 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86Id.
"MId. at 2537.
1979]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
natural gas.88
But City of Philadelphia differs significantly from the cases89 on which
the majority relied. There obviously will be no attempt to move the land-
fills out of New Jersey, as there is in most of the cases involving natural
resources. Nor is there any distinction between the uses to which
residents and nonresidents may put any given landfill; the statute only
deals with the source of refuse, rather than differentiating among the
residences of landfill owners. In such a context, Justice Rehnquist's argu-
ment retains considerable force; since New Jersey would no doubt prefer
there to be no solid waste and no necessity for landfills, and the statute
must be seen as an attempt to protect the state from an increase in health
hazards stemming from out-of-state sources. Thus viewed, City of
Philadelphia stands as a retreat from the general principles underlying
the quarantine cases.
In sharp contrast to City of Philadelphia, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp.9" upheld a state statute notwithstanding the fact that on its face it
treated in-state commercial interests more favorably than out-of-state in-
terests. Hughes dealt with a Maryland statute which was designed to
deal with the problem of disposing of vehicles which were abandoned in
the state. The state legislature found that a .number of bottlenecks ex-
isted in the course that a vehicle follows from abandonment to processing
into scrap metal for ultimate reuse by steel mills; and such a bottleneck
occurred in the junkyards of wrecking companies which tended to ac-
cumulate abandoned vehicles for the resale value of their parts.91 To
remedy the situation, the state required that each Maryland wrecker
desiring to keep abandoned vehicles on its premises obtain a license and
pay a recurring fine for any vehicle of a specified age retained for more
than a year.92 In addition, to enhance the profits earned by wreckers and
others for delivering vehicles to scrap processors, the statute provided
for a bounty to be paid by the state for the destruction by a licensed pro-
cessor of any vehicle formerly titled in Maryland. 93 When a licensed
wrecker delivered the abandoned vehicle, the statute entitled the wrecker
to share the bounty equally with the processor; otherwise the processor
was entitled to retain the entire bounty. While wreckers had to be
Maryland residents in order to be licensed, processors could be residents
asSee Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1921); Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). See also Foster Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1
(1928).
"9Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm'n., 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Great A. & P.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 1937 (1970);
Hood and Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511
(1935); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902).
"0426 U.S. 794 (1976).
'See 426 U.S. at 796.
"2See id at 797 and n. 3, citing Md. Ann. Code, Art. 66 1/2, §5-202, 5-203(d) (Supp. 1975).
"See idL, citing Md. Ann. Code, Art. 66 1/2, §5-205 (Supp. 1975). At the time the suit was
filed, the bounty was $16 per vehicle. 426 U.S. at 797 n.5.
[Vol. 54:165
THE BURGER COURT
of any state.9 4
The Hughes litigation focused on the documentation requirements for
obtaining bounties for the destruction of inoperable vehicles more than
eight years old ("hulks"). As initially enacted, the statute required no
title documentation either on out-of-state or in-state scrap processors. 5
In 1974 the program was changed to require title documentation from all
processors of such hulks. However, while in-state processors had only to
submit a document from the person who delivered the hulk certifying
that person's rights to it and agreeing to indemnify the processor against
third-party claims, in order to receive a bounty on a hulk an out-of-state
processor had to supply either a certificate of title, a police certificate
vesting title, a bill of sale from a police auction, or-if the hulk was ob-
tained from a licensed wrecker-a so-called "Wrecker's Certificate" 96
(essentially a clear title secured by following certain statutory notice pro-
cedures).9 7 The result was that a higher percentage of hulks flowed to in-
state rather than out-of-state processors. The out-of-state processors
challenged the disparate-documentation requirements, alleging that they
impermissibly interfered with the flow of bounty-eligible hulks across
state lines, and thus ran afoul of the commerce clause 29
A three-judge United States District Court struck down the 1974
amendments, holding that they created an impermissible burden on com-
merce. 9 The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Powell's majority
opinion 10 stated that before the question of the extent of the burden on
interstate commerce was considered, one first had to determine whether
Maryland's amendment "was the kind of action'with which the Com-
9'See id. at 797.
In addition to licensed wreckers, at times processors received abandoned vehicles from
the owners of the vehicles or from unlicensed wreckers who, rather than retaining aban-
doned vehicles for their spare-part value, tow such vehicles directly to processors. In order
to ensure a constant supply of abandoned vehicles, processors were often willing to
"rebate" part of the bounty to even unlicensed wreckers. For example, the plaintiff in the
Hughes case regularly paid $14 of the $16 bounty to unlicensed suppliers. See 426 U.S. at
797-98 nn. 4 & 5.
9426 U.S. at 799. A participating processor did, however, have to meet statutory re-
quirements relating to its storage area for vehicles, its records and books of account, and
its processing equipment. Id at 799, n.9, citing Md. Ann. Code art. 66 112, §5-202 (Supp.
1975). In addition, out-of-state processors were required to maintain an "office" in the
state, approved by the State Motor Vehicle Administration, id. citing
Md.A.R.R.§11.02.05.45.
"The documentation requirements imposed on out-of-state processors of hulks were the
same as those imposed on all processors with respect to vehicles which were not hulks. See
426 U.S. at 798.
9426 U.S. at 800-01 & n.10, citing 1974 Md. Laws 465.
9426 U.S. at 802. The processor also argued that the disparate documentation require-
ment violated the equal protection clause. The Court rejected this challenge. 426 U.S. at
810-14.
"Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 F.Supp. 46 (D.Md. 1975)(three-judge court).
°OSix justices joined in the majority opinion. Justice Stevens also filed a concurring
opinion. 426 U.S. at 814-17. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
White and Marshall concurred. Id. at 817-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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merce Clause is concerned."''1 After reviewing cases in which the Court
had struck down state actions as undue interferences with commerce, the
opinion stated that
The common thread of all these cases is that the State in-
terfered with the natural functioning of the interstate market
either through prohibition or through burdensome regulation.
By contrast, Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of
hulks, or to regulate the conditions under which it may occur.
Instead, it has entered into the market itself to bid up their
price. There has been an impact upon the interstate flow of
hulks only because, since the 1974 amendment, Maryland ef-
fectively has made it more lucrative for unlicensed suppliers to
dispose of their hulks in Maryland rather than take them out-
side the State.10 2
The majority concluded that "[n]othing in the purposes animating the
Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional ac-
tion, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its
own citizens over others.' '10 3
Justice Brennan, in dissent, took a quite different view of the case. Re-
jecting the contention that the fact that Hughes involved a state subsidy
was relevant under the commerce clause, he asserted that "a State's
refusal for purposes of economic protectionism to purchase for end use
items produced elsewhere is a facial and obvious 'discrimination against
interstate commerce' that...'the commerce clause by its own force pro-
hibits....' ",104 Even assuming a legitimate state purpose, he would have
required that the discrimination be struck down if there was less
discriminatory alternative available.105 Because the case came before the
Court in a summary judgment posture, Justice Brennan would have
remanded for the development of a fuller factual record.10 6
There can be no doubt that there was facial discrimination between in-
state and out-of-state processors in the Hughes case. Nonetheless, the
majority upheld that statute, in effect creating a subcategory of state ac-
tions apparently immune from commerce clause scrutiny. The clash
between the majority and dissenting opinions on this point graphically il-
lustrates the tensions between competing principles of federalism which
underlies commerce clause jurisprudence. Justice Brennan's opinion
focuses on the principle that the concept of national unity requires that
101426 U.S. at 805.
12I& at 806 (footnote omitted).
'M3Id at 810 (footnotes omitted). Justice Powell explicitly distinguished those cases in
which a foreign corporation enters a state in response to private market forces and is then
subjected to discriminating taxes or regulations. Id at 810 n. 20.
1*0426 U.S. at 820 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting South Carolina State Hwy. Dept. v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938).
10426 U.S. at 831. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"'
6 at 831-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 54:165
THE BURGER COURT
all producers have access to markets on the same terms-the principle
which was ultimately decisive in Hunt and City of Philadelphia. But the
dissent entirely discounts a countervailing principle of federalism that is,
basic to the constitutional scheme-the principle that the states remain
sovereign (or at least quasi-sovereign). It is this latter concept which in-
formed the Court's decision in Exxon and the dissenting opinion in City
of Philadelphia.
Hughes implicates one of the most basic incidents of state sovereignty-
-that a state may limit its largesse to persons residing within its
borders. 10 7 While recent developments in equal protection law have
limited each state's ability to discriminate among its residents, no case
has held that a state which pays benefits to those within its own jurisdic-
tion must also pay to those who reside elsewhere. Thus, for example,
while Shapiro v. Thompson0 8 held that a state may not exclude recent ar-
rivals from eligibility for welfare benefits, the Court indicated in that
case that insuring that recipients of welfare benefits were state residents
was a legitimate state interest.109
This theme was reemphasized in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Ser-
vice Commission.110 There a requirement that Philadelphia policemen
reside in the city was challenged under the Equal Protection Clause.
Despite the requirement's obvious impact on policemen's right to
travel- their right to migrate and settle where they please-the Court
upheld the regulation against constitutional attack.' Similarly, in
Califano v. Torres"2 the Court was faced with a challenge to a provision of
the Social Security Act which provided certain benefits to residents of
'1"This principle of federalism appears to have provided the major underpinning for
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794,
816 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (commerce clause does not inhibit "a state's power to
experiment with different methods of encouraging local industry"). See also i& at 822 n.4
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Commentators have suggested a variety of possible justifications for the Hughes result.
Some have argued that it may rest upon the theory that the commerce clause does not af-
fect the "proprietary" as opposed to the "governmental" actions of the states. See, e.g., L.
TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 336 (1978); Note, 18 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 893,
910-18 (1977). See also American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U.S. 904 aff's. Mem. 339 F.
Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (three-judge court) (Summary affirmance of lower court deci-
sion relying on proprietary/governmental function distinction to reject challenge to
Florida statute and regulations requiring that all public printing for state be done in
Florida. Another suggested justification is the theory that the commerce clause is aimed
primarily at maximizing consumer choice rather than producers' access to markets. See L.
TRIBE, supra at 337; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 56, 61-62 (1976).
Finally, one commentator has suggested that some attempt might be made to justify
Hughes on the theory that the commerce clause does not constrain state actions where
"traditional state governmental functions" are involved. Note, 18 B.C. IND. & COMM. L.
REV. 893, 918-20, citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
10394 U.S. 618 (1969).
1"Id. at 634 (describing determination of residency of applicant for welfare as admittedly
permissible state objective).
110424 U.S. 645 (1976) (per curiam).
"'Compare Hicklin v. Orbeck, 98 S.Ct. 2482 (1978) (striking down requirement that
private businesses give preference to residents of state).
112435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam).
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the fifty states and the District of Columbia but not to residents of Puer-
to Rico. Reversing a district court holding that the exclusion of Puerto
Rico impermissibly interfered with potential recipents, the Court stated
that:
This Court has never held that the constitutional right to
travel embraces any such doctrine, and we decline to do so
now. Such a doctrine would apply with equal force to any
benefits a State might provide for its residents, and would re-
quire a State to continue to pay those benefits indefinitely to
any persons who had once resided there. And the broader im-
plications of such a doctrine in other areas of substantive law
would bid fair to destory the independent power of each State
under our Constitution to enact laws uniformly applicable to
all of its residents.1 1 3
Of course, neither Torres nor McCarthy dealt directly with commerce
clause challenges. However, the similar considerations of federalism con-
trol both right-to-travel and commerce clause analyses."4 Indeed, if
anything these principles have been seen as giving greater protection to
the right to travel than to the free flow of commerce."' To illustrate the
applicability to Hughes of the principles underlying McCarthy and Tor-
res, consider the following hypothetical. Assume that the only source for
the element zinchronium is a mine in the state of Maryland. While there
are a number of uses for- the element, zinchronium is most valuable, and
thus brings its highest price, for use in the manufacture of Maryland
license plates (all other states make their license plates from tin). Further
assume that Maryland has been buying its license plates from a Virginia
manufacturer who specializes in zinchronium products. Thus zin-
chronium flows from Maryland to Virginia; license plates flow from
Virginia to Maryland. Certainly there would be no constitutional objec-
tion to Maryland's deciding (for any reason) to cease buying plates and
11I. at 4-5 (footnote omitted).
One possible ground for decision that the Court might have adopted in Torres is that in-
terferences with the right to travel to Puerto Rico should be governed by the more lenient
standards applied to regulations of international as opposed to interstate travel. Compare,
e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (international travel) with e.g., United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966) (interstate travel). However, Torres was decided on the
assumption that, just as with interestate travel, there is a "virtually unqualified" constitu-
tional right to travel between Puerto Rico and any of the 50 states of the Union. See 435
U.S. at 4 n.6.
14See The Supreme Court-1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 13, 117 & n.35 (1974). Compare
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (origins of right to travel) with Hood &
Sons, Inc., v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (principles underlying commerce clause).
'See Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1978) (per curiam) (right to travel between
states "virtually unqualified"). Compare Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (right
to travel protected under commerce clause) with i& at 177-81 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(right to travel more strongly protected than flow of commerce). See also, e.g., Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(penalties on right to travel subject to strict scrutiny). Compare Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975) (upholding durational residence requirements for divorce).
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instead, setting up a Department of License Plates in the state capitol to
buy zinchronium and produce its own plates. Further, under McCarthy
there is no constitutional impediment to Maryland limiting employment
in the Department of License Plates to state residents.
If one substitutes unprocessed hulks for zinchronium and processed
hulks for license plates, for commerce clause purposes the Hughes situa-
tion is exactly the same as the license plate hypothetical. Both cases
involve a state subsidized market; both involve a change in state policy
which effectively reallocates any profit from the state market to state
residents from out-of-state producers; and both have the result of
reducing the outflow of a raw material. The only distinction between the
two situations is that in Hughes, the junkyard owners were independent
contractors, working only part-time on state business, rather than full
time state employees, as in the license plate hypothetical. However, this
difference is irrelevant to any of the policies which underlie the com-
merce clause; certainly it makes no difference to the Virginia producer
who is excluded from the market. Thus while the Hughes result may
seem incongruous if viewed in terms of the commerce clause in
isolation,"6 the case seems perfectly in concert with the general principles
which form the basis for the Constitution as a whole.
CONCLUSION
In dealing with cases involving laws with differential- effects on in-
terstate and intrastate commerce, it is entirely too easy to be beguiled by
the simplicity of the formulation that discrimination equals automatic in-
validation. But like many commerce clause problems, delicate accom-
modations between competing concerns of state sovereignty and national
unity are often necessary to reach appropriate conclusions when such
laws are challenged. At times-particularly in Hughes-the Burger
Court has shown admirable sensitivity to these conflicting concerns in
avoiding a jurisprudence based on mere mechanical recitation of
sometimes inappropriate formulas. But in other cases, an apparent in-
ability to come to grips with the relevant considerations has led to incon-
sistent results, as is demonstrated by Hunt and Exxon. Hopefully, future
cases will resolve these inconsistencies and give coherence to this impor-
tant area of constitutional jurisprudence.
116See Note, supra n. 108, at 921-29.
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